Can I Call Kimura Crazy? Ethical Tensions in Cultural Defense by Goel, Rashmi
Seattle Journal for Social Justice 
Volume 3 Issue 1 Article 42 
November 2004 
Can I Call Kimura Crazy? Ethical Tensions in Cultural Defense 
Rashmi Goel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj 
Recommended Citation 
Goel, Rashmi (2004) "Can I Call Kimura Crazy? Ethical Tensions in Cultural Defense," Seattle Journal for 
Social Justice: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 , Article 42. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol3/iss1/42 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle 
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal for Social Justice 
by an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact 
coteconor@seattleu.edu. 
 443 




Fumiko Kimura walked into the ocean with her two small children.  She 
was fully aware of what she was doing.  Distraught at discovering that her 
husband of six years had been having an affair for the last three, she knew 
that the only solution was to commit suicide, and to take her son Kazutaka, 
four years old, and daughter Yuri, six months old, with her.  She would 
commit oyaku shinju2—an ancient Japanese practice of parent-child suicide.  
Kimura was saved.  Her children were not.  In California Superior Court, 
Kimura was charged with murder.3   
Fumiko Kimura’s lawyer interposed the defense of temporary insanity,4 
based in part on a belief that any mother who kills her children must be 
insane.  And yet, what Fumiko Kimura did was anything but insane.  Based 
on cultural imperatives, imperatives that shaped her conceptions of 
mothering, Fumiko Kimura engaged in conduct that was, though illegal, 
culturally permissible.  Thus, the moment her attorney decided to craft a 
defense that characterized her act as deranged, her legal adventure became a 
clash of cultures in which her voice was submerged by her lawyer’s voice, a 
voice that ultimately failed to explain her actions and failed to advocate for 
her future.   
Because of the cultural implications for the client as a whole, lawyers 
faced with this unfamiliar territory of complex cultural difference must 
choose defense strategies carefully.  In this case, Kimura’s lawyer, Gerald 
Klausner,5 chose to argue temporary insanity.  Judged narrowly, this 
strategy was successful:  the charge was eventually reduced to voluntary 
manslaughter for which Fumiko Kimura received a one-year sentence (time 
served awaiting trial) and five years of probation with mandatory 
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psychological counseling.6  Yet, Klausner’s approach was flawed because it 
did not take into account Fumiko Kimura’s own cultural background as a 
basis for her decision to commit oyaku shinju.  Fumiko Kimura hardly met 
the standard for temporary insanity,7 but by proferring this defense, 
Klausner implied too much about Japanese culture.8  If Kimura’s actions 
constituted temporary insanity, despite their being in keeping with Japanese 
culture, wouldn’t that make Japanese culture similarly insane?  Judged 
broadly, such a defense is not only offensive, but harmful.   
What does it say when a lawyer asserts in court, and even convinces the 
judge to hold, that a widely held cultural belief9 is in fact insane?  Do the 
ramifications of such a strategy matter?  Such creative lawyering raises a 
host of ethical problems, not only because of its implications for the 
community but, foremost, because of its implications for the client.  In the 
pages that follow, I endeavor to draw attention to this thorny ethical issue: 
in the context of the cultural defense, how should an attorney meet the 
strenuous obligation of mounting a zealous defense without compromising 
the cultural integrity of the client?10 
The solution, I suggest, lies in our characterization of the client’s 
interests.  Both zealous advocacy and justice would be better served by a 
client-centered approach that perceives the client beyond her legal interests.  
In fact, I believe that the lawyer should seek the best overall outcome for 
the client, and in so doing, must understand and advocate for the whole 
client, ensuring that the client’s voice is infused into the proceedings by 
taking into account the client’s cultural background and personal values. 
This essay is divided into four sections.  In part one, I provide greater 
detail about Fumiko Kimura and her motivations for committing oyaku 
shinju.  In parts two and three, I will touch on the duties of a lawyer to 
zealously advocate for the legal interests of the client and explore the 
dangers of ignoring culture in a client’s defense.  Finally, I will draw on 
legal ethics literature to suggest a way in which the whole client, including 
her legal and cultural interests, could be better served. 
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PART I:  FUMIKO KIMURA—THE WHOLE CLIENT 
Fumiko Kimura was one of six children from a broken home.  Despite 
her strong interest in piano, she was unable to gain entrance into Japan’s 
National Music University and, as a result, chose to leave Japan and pursue 
other interests in California.  Though she enrolled in a community college, 
she never graduated.  She married a Japanese American but divorced after 
eight years.  She later met Itsuroku Kimura whom she married in 1979.11  
At the time of her oyaku shinju attempt, she had been living in the United 
States for fourteen years; however, she remained Japanese in her thinking 
and lifestyle, isolated from American culture.12  Fumiko Kimura did not 
drive, knew nothing of her husband’s business, and had no hobbies or close 
friends outside the family.13  Ten days prior to her suicide attempt, Fumiko 
Kimura discovered that her husband had been having an extramarital affair 
for three years.14  Fumiko Kimura decided to end her life, and to take her 
children with her. 
Fumiko Kimura did not perceive her actions as wrong.  Based on her own 
cultural ideals and values, she was doing the right thing.  In Fumiko 
Kimura’s case, conceptions of shame, suicide, and mothering coincided in a 
way that was uniquely Japanese and rendered her choice unavoidable.   
A.  Japanese Conceptions of Shame 
Upon discovering her husband’s affair, Fumiko Kimura was deeply 
ashamed and dejected.  Rather than marking him as a philanderer or 
unscrupulous adulterer, Itsuroku Kimura’s transgression indicated to 
Fumiko Kimura that she was a bad wife who was unable to please her 
husband despite all her efforts.  This shame was perhaps even more 
pronounced because the affair had actually been revealed one year earlier, at 
which time Itsuroku Kimura had promised to end it.15  In fact, he did not, so 
Fumiko Kimura was twice betrayed.  Her efforts to be the perfect wife and 
mother had fallen short; otherwise her husband would not have returned to 
his mistress after promising to end the affair.  Fumiko Kimura considered 
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other possibilities such as returning to Japan,16 but none could save her or 
her children from the stigma of a failed marriage.17 
According to sociologist Dr. Yuko Kawanishi, children in Japan do suffer 
ill effects from being fatherless or being from a one-parent family.  In 
Japan, there are few orphanages and foster care facilities, and a mother 
would not want to leave her children at the mercy of a stepmother.18  
Sometimes these children are denied jobs even as adults because of the 
shameful family background.19 
B.  Japanese Conceptions of Suicide 
Fumiko Kimura’s decision to end her life was not necessarily a mark of 
mental illness.  While suicide in the United States is generally considered a 
mark of mental instability, it is clear that the view of suicide in Japan is 
markedly different.  In Japan, the symbolic sacrifice of human life simply 
takes on many more meanings than in the United States, where it is viewed 
as merely a sad tragedy or a mental illness.  Though I hesitate to argue that 
suicide is a commonly accepted or an honored practice in Japanese culture, 
the actions of Fumiko Kimura, her husband, and the mistress, are at least 
illustrative of a unique readiness to see suicide as a solution in difficult 
situations.  Itsuroku Kimura’s mistress, Kazue Tanahashi,20 personally 
revealed the ongoing affair to Fumiko Kimura by phone and even showed 
her love letters.  Tanahashi later sent a letter to Fumiko Kimura on January 
27, 1985, “offering to kill herself if that would help ease the family’s 
pain.”21  Another report stated that Tanahashi was thinking of killing 
Itsuroku Kimura and herself.22  According to Alfred Kriman, police reports 
revealed that, “Mrs. Kimura [then] made some attempts to apologize to the 
mistress.23  She had a boy deliver a note containing an apology and offering 
to ‘sacrifice her own life if the problem could be settled.’”24  When Itsuroku 
Kimura learned of his son’s death at the hospital, he threatened to take his 
own life.25  At some point, every member of this love triangle offered to 
commit suicide.  According to Dr. Kawanishi, suicide in Japanese culture 
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may be more readily perceived as an option (even though an option of last 
resort) because “there seem to be greater ‘vocabularies of motives’” for 
suicide.  One can commit suicide not only for self-destruction or self-hatred, 
but also from such motivations as punishing others, saving face, expressing 
apology, or loving another with such strong attachment that taking that 
person’s life with one’s own is necessary.”26 
C.  Japanese Conceptions of Mothering 
For Fumiko Kimura, one of her greatest motivators was her role as a 
mother.  She was completely devoted to her children.  She had all her 
furniture removed from her living room, including her piano, to avoid 
possible injury to the children should they fall.  She even kept a schedule 
designating specific times to play with her son.27  Such attention is 
consistent with the Japanese views of motherhood as a transcendent state of 
being that surpasses all other life roles.28  Studies have found that mothers 
in Japan are particularly role bound in this regard, for instance, they 
generally mark stages in their own lives by their children’s ages.29  Fumiko 
Kimura knew that leaving her children behind,30 motherless in a cruel 
world, would be a greater wrong than taking them with her.  She could not 
abandon them in the world to remain without her care and protection.31  She 
was particularly concerned that her children would suffer the stigma of her 
failure as a wife and mother and would be cruelly treated.  Nor could she 
live with them and give them the care and protection they needed; she had 
nowhere to go and no means of support.  Fumiko Kimura’s failed marriage 
almost necessitated her suicide, and her great motherly love for her children 
necessitated that she take them with her.  An examination of this belief is 
instructive: 
In Japan, the mother-child bond and the mother’s dedication to the 
child are very important.  Why then, is infanticide committed by 
the mother relatively common in Japan?  Paradoxically, it is this 
very bond between mother and child that causes oyako shinju.  
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According to Japanese logic, the suicidal mother cannot bear to 
leave the child to survive alone; she would rather kill the child 
because she believes that nobody else in the world would take care 
of the child better than she, and that the child would be better off 
dying with her.32  
Indeed, to commit suicide alone, leaving her children behind, would not 
make Fumiko Kimura more caring but would confirm her failure as a 
mother and brand her with demonlike behavior.33  Such abandonment 
would be beyond cruel and would stain the children with the shame of an 
adulterous father and a suicidal mother, who did not love her children 
enough to take them with her.34   
D.  Interdependence 
When we view these three factors together, we find that the essential 
difference in Japanese societal mores is the deeply embedded notion of 
interdependence.  Unlike the high degree of individualism prized and 
promoted in American culture, Japanese culture values relations and 
interdependence, where the self is submerged in the network of roles a 
person has in relation to others.35  Therefore, for a mother, the deprivation 
of a child’s life is an extended extinguishing of one’s own life, not a 
violation of the child’s individual rights.  The child is not really an 
individual, but part of the mother.  The child could not exist without the 
mother and is entirely dependent on the mother.36  The mother is similarly 
dependent on the existence of the child. 
Such a belief system is entirely at odds with our own notions of 
independence and autonomy and, in particular, the notions of individualism 
and personal culpability that pervade our legal system.  Kimura was not 
charged with the crime of attempted suicide, but with the murder of her two 
children.  Under California criminal law, Kimura must be culpable precisely 
because she failed to recognize her children as separate entities, deserving 
of life without her, no matter how miserable.  Yet, for Fumiko Kimura to 
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acknowledge her children as separate entities would brand her a bad mother.  
While Kimura’s marital situation might have pushed her toward suicide 
regardless of her culture, it was her culture that propelled her to take the 
lives of her children.  Fumiko Kimura was damned either way: by the 
California penal system for not recognizing her offspring as separate, or by 
her own culture for treating them as separate.    
In choosing to ignore or discard the cultural factors involved in Kimura’s 
act, Klausner (her attorney), the prosecutor, and the legal system itself, 
failed to acknowledge not only her background but also her motivations.  
Instead, she was measured by a narrow Western conception of sanity, one 
she could not possibly meet because her own cultural views on suicide and 
mothering stood in stark contrast. 
PART II:  THE LAWYER AS ZEALOUS ADVOCATE 
Given this difficult and complex circumstance, what were Klausner’s 
obligations to Fumiko Kimura?  Did he make the right choice?  The 
Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct refers to “A Lawyer’s 
Responsibilities” and states, “A lawyer is a representative of clients, an 
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility 
for the quality of justice.” 37   Later, the same preamble states:   
A lawyer’s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer 
of the legal system, and a public citizen are usually harmonious.  
Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be 
a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time 
assume that justice is being done.38 
Practitioners and academics alike have long ascribed great importance to 
the lawyer’s role of zealous advocate.  They suggest that we recall the 
famous words of Lord Brougham (a nineteenth century lord chancellor of 
England and brilliant orator): 
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person 
in all the world, and that person is his client.  To save that client by 
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all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other 
persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; 
and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the 
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.  
Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must 
go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his 
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.39 
Though spoken over one hundred years ago, Lord Brougham’s advice 
remains the dominant approach in understanding the ethics of lawyering.   
Generally, any limitations on zealous advocacy are articulated as an 
aspect of the other roles lawyers are required to play.  Legal authors have 
long wrestled with the question of how to balance the roles of zealous 
advocate and officer of the court charged with the pursuit of justice.40  
While all agree there is some tension between these roles, most see the 
criminal trial as the one indisputable arena where the lawyer’s obligation 
runs to the client and not to the world at large.  The Model Rules and their 
most recent revisions seem to echo this view.41  Even as an officer of the 
court in the criminal context, the defense lawyer’s primary duty is to see 
that the client receives a zealous defense, because truly zealous advocacy is 
the client’s only hope against the unyielding arm of the state.  Within the 
boundaries of the law, we say that the lawyer should do everything within 
his or her power to achieve the best possible legal outcome for the client.  
Much has been written about the parameters of such a pursuit, and I do 
not wish to reexamine it all here.  My concern lies with this very narrow 
conception of the client and her interests.  Why should our understanding of 
the client be limited to her legal interests and not to her other interests as 
well?42  Modern-day academics have vigorously continued this debate.43  I 
suggest that the best way to achieve the balance between zealous advocacy 
and the pursuit of justice is to expand our notions of the client’s interests to 
encompass the client’s non-legal interests and her future outside of the 
courtroom.  Such a change is more likely to include a pursuit of justice 
simply because it looks beyond the legal realm.44  In fact, by restricting the 
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understanding of the client to legal interests alone, we subject the client to a 
type of legal straightjacket and bind ourselves to a more limiting vision of 
the law’s power.  Opening ourselves to the client’s other interests, 
especially cultural interests, frees us from such oppression and allows us to 
better serve the client as a whole, while still balancing zealous advocacy 
and the pursuit of justice. 
PART III:  THE DANGERS OF IGNORING CULTURAL EVIDENCE 
Admittedly, Kimura’s lawyer was faced with a very difficult choice.  He 
chose to argue that Kimura was not in her right senses, and that despair and 
anxiety led her to snap and become desperate and irrational.  He could have 
argued that Kimura was acting rationally, fully aware of her actions and 
their consequences.  Such an approach would likely have resulted in a guilty 
verdict for first degree murder, with only the tragedy of the circumstances 
to mitigate her sentence.  Lauren Weis, the prosecutor assigned to the case, 
understood this point perfectly when she responded in a TV interview, “[I]f 
Mrs. Kimura did in fact kill her children because of her cultural 
background, it would seem to show that she intended to kill them, and that 
she was competent, and that she was thinking of doing that, that she was 
deliberately doing that.”45 
I am not suggesting the attorneys in this matter were culturally ignorant.  
In fact, the following newspaper accounts demonstrate that the attorneys 
were acutely aware of the cultural evidence, which they decided not to 
present: 
Kimura’s attorney, Gerald Klausner, is not inclined to stress 
the cultural angle, although he acknowledged that others 
believe it is her best defense.46 
‘They think that [the fact that] she’s Japanese should be 
defense enough, that the defense should rest more on her 
culture,’ [Klausner] said.  Klausner hasn’t decided whether or 
not to use insanity as a possible defense, although he describes 
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his client as ‘mentally deranged at the time—with a Japanese 
flavor, a Japanese fashion.’47 
The case, says Deputy District Attorney Lauren L. Weis, ‘is 
very, very difficult,’ but she rejects the use of Japanese law. . . 
. ‘You’re treading on such shaky ground when you decide 
something based on a cultural thing because our society is 
made up of so many different cultures.  It is very hard to draw 
the line somewhere, but they are living in our country and 
people have to abide by our laws or else you have anarchy.’48 
Was it proper for the defense counsel to paint Fumiko Kimura as 
temporarily insane, when she was merely acting consistent with her own 
cultural values?  I do not wish to understate the predicament facing the 
attorneys in this case, and, in fact, I do not dispute the correctness of the 
final legal outcome.  Credit for time served and five years of probation with 
mandatory psychiatric counseling was a merciful sentence and one very 
similar to any she might have received in Japan.49  The legal constraints at 
the time forced defense attorney Klausner to forego the introduction of 
cultural evidence.  His choice, however, not to discuss the cultural 
motivations in the courtroom, had two undesirable effects: (1) he relegated 
any such discussion to the media frenzy surrounding the event; and (2) he 
deprived Kimura of the opportunity to be heard as a whole person and to 
preserve her cultural dignity.50 
A.  The Danger of Leaving Culture to the Media  
By relegating the discussion of cultural factors to newspapers, magazines, 
and television, the media became the vehicle charged with accurate 
representation of Japanese culture and the complex facts surrounding 
Fumiko Kimura’s oyaku shinju attempt.  The views and values of the 
Japanese community were heard only in snippets and sound bites.  The idea 
that morality might be culturally relative, as opposed to universal, was 
removed from the purview of the court, arguably the best place for such a 
conversation to occur.51  Instead, placing this conversation in the forum of 
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public opinion leaves the conversation vulnerable to the use of stereotypes 
and untruth. 
The media simply did not allow for full and nuanced discussions about 
Kimura and why she chose to do what she did.  This is evidenced in the 
numerous and varied newspaper accounts of Fumiko Kimura’s life and her 
oyaku shinju attempt.  The newspaper reports seldom included a discussion 
of the relevant law or what the punishment, if any, might be in Japan.52  
Very few included any discussion of Fumiko Kimura’s level of acclimation 
to American society.53 Stereotypes about Japanese submissiveness were 
allowed to buoy entire stories.  Several papers covering the events gave 
variant reports on Kimura’s ability to speak English and her status in the 
country.54  Given the short coverage allotted to cultural background in 
television and newspaper reports, it is not possible to explore in any depth 
the complexities of culture.  Reporters are therefore forced to rely on 
stereotypes and the background knowledge, experiences, and 
misinformation that their audience possesses. 
One is moved to ask what effect relegating cultural issues to the media 
reporting has on relations between cultures, especially if our conception of 
justice includes greater intercultural understanding.55  In leaving this 
important discussion to the media, do we further or frustrate multicultural 
harmony?  I would argue that, like racial and gender stereotypes perpetuated 
in the media, the misapprehension of cultural matters in the media causes 
harm, especially in a heterogeneous society such as ours.  Cultural 
stereotyping is particularly pernicious and difficult to eradicate.  Unlike 
with racial and gender stereotypes, most people lack a frame of reference 
with cultural stereotypes.  In race and gender cases, the public has some 
personal experience to draw on—positive or negative.  People may hold 
negative stereotypes about women (“all women are bad drivers”) or about 
other races (“African American males are dangerous”), but there are 
tremendous daily opportunities to disavow such beliefs.  For instance, one 
may have a mild mannered African American colleague, or may know a 
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woman who is an excellent driver.  Even if some who hold such stereotypes 
about women and African Americans find only deeper proof in the 
exception, such beliefs are at least open to debate through the individual’s 
own personal contact and experience with members of the other group.  In 
other words, there is a greater likelihood that people will see through race 
and gender stereotypes based on their own personal experiences.   
In contrast, stereotypes in the cultural context are unlikely to be 
counteracted in this fashion since people are much less likely to know, and 
to know about, individuals of differing cultural backgrounds.  Even if 
members of the public do have personal experience with individuals who 
share the defendant’s culture, they are unlikely to know significant facts 
about the culture itself because such matters are usually considered very 
personal.  For instance, a Muslim coworker is unlikely to talk about the 
expectations he has of his wife, yet there is a pervasive stereotype that 
Muslim men are controlling and abusive toward their wives, daughters, and 
sisters.  Similarly, there are strong stereotypes that Latino males are macho 
and hot tempered and that Asian women are submissive.  As such, I suggest 
that the cultural stereotypes are more harmful than the racial or sexist 
stereotypes because the average person has little personal experience to 
counteract the reports given in newspapers and magazines. 
In addition, cultural stereotypes are more dangerous because they fill the 
void of ignorance with a monolithic representation of something incredibly 
complex.  The history of the cultural stereotype is bound up with 
colonialism, evangelism, world history, and modern politics.  Culture, 
unlike race and gender, is an inherently dynamic characteristic, changing 
over time and place with historic events and shifts in population.  Like 
stereotypes about race, cultural stereotypes take on a particular importance 
as they provide shorthand characterizations about other groups.  Instead of 
promoting the search for truth, such portrayals capitalize on ignorance and 
fear.  Furthermore, without some personal experience of the relevant 
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culture, an individual is unlikely to voice or hear objections to the use of 
cultural stereotypes. 
Despite the large Japanese population in southern California, most people 
were unaware of oyaku shinju before the case of Fumiko Kimura.  The 
miniseries Shogun, which aired in 1980 to captivated audiences, delivered a 
mesmerizing portrait of feudal Japan, and was the greatest cultural 
education about Japan around this time.56  Although popular, the Shogun 
miniseries did little, if anything, to educate Americans about the Japan of 
the 1980s or the cultural imperatives that motivated Kimura.   
The Japanese community itself felt that the justice system should know 
its side of the story and understand Fumiko Kimura as a whole person with 
a cultural background that profoundly influenced her actions.  The Japanese 
American community responded to Fumiko Kimura’s case with petitions in 
an attempt to educate the judge and the public.  Members of the community 
rallied and circulated petitions explaining the history of oyaku shinju and 
asking that Kimura be judged by Japanese standards.  The petitions 
garnered more than 25,000 signatures from people in the United States, 
Canada, Germany, and beyond.57  The community did not want Japanese 
culture, including this small part of Japanese culture, to be portrayed as 
deranged, even if it was the best legal defense available at the time. 
Despite the remarkable efforts of the Japanese community worldwide, I 
firmly assert that by ignoring culture, the legal approach taken in this case 
did a tremendous disservice to both the Japanese American community and 
the community at large.  It relegated the discussion of culture to an 
environment where stereotypes could flourish and then left the Japanese 
American community to protect itself from the resulting harm.   
B.  The Fall Out of Depriving Fumiko Kimura of Her Cultural Voice  
In this case, it is not even necessary to contextualize the impact in terms 
of the community, because Klausner’s choice to assert a temporary insanity 
defense also had an effect on Fumiko Kimura herself.  In suppressing 
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Fumiko Kimura’s cultural story, Klausner deprived her of a dignified 
narrative.  Removing her story from its cultural moorings rendered Fumiko 
Kimura malevolent or undeniably unbalanced in the eyes of American 
culture.  Within an American cultural framework, her behavior cannot be 
understood as rational or based on a healthy desire to prove her love to her 
children.  Such an explanation only makes sense in the context of Japanese 
culture.  Her conceptions of shame, suicide, mothering, and 
interdependence, which motivated her actions, were left outside the 
courtroom door, and she remained silenced by a legal system that failed to 
take into account her unique circumstances.   
Aware that the client will return to society and to her community, we 
must ask what effect any particular legal strategy has on her relationship 
with her community.  If her lawyer portrays her culture as crazy in the 
courtroom, will her community ostracize her?  If she is presented as a 
victim of an oppressive and unyielding set of traditions, will her own 
community judge her a traitor?  Having assented to the role of a deranged 
person, will she ever be able to reclaim the title of deeply devoted mother 
that her community once bestowed on her?  By placing her actions outside 
their cultural frame, Klausner effectively removed Fumiko Kimura from her 
place in her community and framed her as legally insane within the 
mainstream community.  As a result, she became an outsider in both 
communities, losing her status as a mother and finding her only source of 
support to be the husband who betrayed her.  More attention to Fumiko 
Kimura’s non-legal interests could have rendered a more palatable solution. 
PART IV:  THE MIDDLE ROAD—A CULTURAL DEFENSE 
I have stated that Klausner had two choices: 1) he could have argued that 
Fumiko Kimura was acting in her right senses, which would have subjected 
her to a probable guilty verdict; or 2) he could have argued that she was not 
in her right senses, but legally insane.  He chose the second.  But there was 
also a third option—a middle-of-the-road solution.58  Klausner could have 
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argued that what Kimura did was not wrong and that our own notions of 
suicide, mothering, and interdependence should be reexamined.  At a 
minimum, such an approach would have required a detailed and nuanced 
understanding of who Fumiko Kimura was and why she decided to commit 
oyaku shinju.  In other words, it would have required introducing cultural 
evidence. 
Since 1985 when Kimura was first charged, a number of cases have 
offered cultural evidence to provide context and background for the 
defendant’s actions.59  In general, there are two approaches to the cultural 
defense.  The first approach proffers evidence to demonstrate that, given the 
defendant’s cultural background, the defendant perceived the situation such 
that no crime was really committed.  We might call this a cognitive cultural 
defense case.  For example, due to his cultural background, one particular 
defendant believed that a woman was actually consenting to intercourse 
when in fact she was not.60  Such defenses allow the defendant to utilize 
standard criminal defenses such as mistake of fact.  In the second approach, 
evidence is introduced to prove that the defendant’s behavior, though 
reprehensible and criminal in the United States, is nonetheless legally or 
culturally permitted, or even required, in the defendant’s home country.  We 
might call this a normative cultural defense case.  For example, an Iranian 
father may argue that in his culture it is appropriate to arrange and complete 
his young daughter’s marriage at age twelve to a much older and 
established man.  A host of questions arise from these two approaches.  It is 
not my aim to address them here, only to say that in both scenarios we are 
forced to examine the whole client.  In the second category of cases 
especially, we are forced to confront our own community values and 
notions of justice.    
The tension between community justice lawyering and zealous advocacy 
has spawned a few solutions that might prove useful in the cultural context.  
Anthony Alfieri writes prolifically in the area of lawyering and racial 
stereotypes.61  Alfieri generally prefers a strong version of “race conscious 
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lawyering”62 that requires the lawyer to refrain from using “racialized” 
narratives63 when the lawyer knows they might negatively affect the 
community.  Alfieri argues that lawyers have a responsibility to prevent 
causing racial disharmony in the community.  Such an approach clearly 
weighs heavily on the side of community justice rather than zealous 
advocacy.   
Alfieri concedes that a weaker prescription might be a suitable 
compromise, for example, giving the client the power to make such 
decisions.64  He recommends that the lawyer have a comprehensive 
conversation65 with the client to explain the possible community 
repercussions, while allowing the client to make the decision.  According to 
Alfieri, the client is the best person to judge how any particular strategy 
involving racial evidence would affect her, her family, and her community.  
Alfieri’s approach recognizes that the client may have interests beyond the 
legal outcome of the trial, including racial harmony in her community.  It 
also recognizes that the client is ultimately in the best position to decide 
whether or not to forgo those interests in favor of her legal and liberty 
interests.  
While I find Alfieri’s stronger position attractive in its idealism, his 
weaker prescription holds the most promise for cases involving cultural 
evidence.  Such an approach would recognize the whole client beyond her 
legal interests and incorporate her personal and cultural interests as well. 
Alfieri’s alternative prescription requires an attorney to have a 
comprehensive conversation with the client and then allow the client to 
make the ultimate decision regarding cultural evidence.  In adopting this 
approach, an attorney must be sure to examine how such a conversation 
with the client will be carried out.  Which implications should the attorney 
highlight?  Should the attorney point out only the likelihood of success on 
the merits and the fact that the strategy may be controversial?  Should the 
attorney ask the client for her views and feelings about having her cultural 
beliefs portrayed as insane?  The comprehensive conversation should not 
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emphasize only the client’s legal interests but should also include an 
acknowledgement of the limitations of the criminal law and also the battle 
between the value systems inherent in the legal strategy. 
Should the attorney tell the client that a positive legal result from a 
temporary insanity plea will most likely result in psychiatric counseling that 
might challenge her core belief system?  Should the attorney explain that in 
agreeing to this strategy, the client may in fact be acquiescing to Western 
notions of personal autonomy and independence (even for six-month-old 
infants) and shunning the notions of interdependence inherent in the cultural 
practice of oyaku shinju?  This kind of approach would allow the client to 
assess the possible ramifications vis-à-vis her own culture and examine 
whether she is ready to either abandon them or at least pretend to abandon 
them.  Should the attorney tell the client that her community might shun her 
if she chooses such a course or allow her to raise such a concern herself?  
Unfortunately, in Fumiko Kimura’s case, it does not appear that this 
conversation took place.66  Devoted to the best possible legal outcome for 
his client, Klausner could not make room for Kimura’s cultural voice.  
Understanding the client beyond her legal interests would necessitate such a 
conversation, however, and allow an opportunity to incorporate the client’s 
voice into the adopted legal strategy.  
PART V: CONCLUSION 
In 1985, it was unlikely that a cultural defense would have worked; both 
attorneys were hamstrung by a system that acknowledged only legal 
wrongs67 and left very little room for the cultural factors that affected 
Fumiko Kimura.  Since that time the law has changed.  Overall, the criminal 
justice system has moved further toward an individual standard and away 
from the reasonable person standard that peppered criminal law and 
precluded Fumiko Kimura from using cultural evidence.68  Many attorneys 
who have since used cultural evidence insist that the time is ripe to 
thoroughly consider the effect of cultural background on individual 
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culpability.  The last twenty years have spawned a number of cultural 
defense cases69 and many judges now admit and consider cultural evidence.  
While not every lawyer is willing to wear the mantle of trailblazer, the law 
is not formed by precedent alone; the law’s power is its ability and 
willingness to respond to societal needs.  For example, battered-woman’s 
syndrome was allowed as a defense only by forcing open the doors of 
jurisprudence to encompass a battered woman’s experience. 
Today’s lawyers are at least obligated to pay heed to the path forged by 
others.  Legal academics urge us to further consider the possibility of law by 
examining its effect and potential for those oppressed through racial, 
gender, and cultural dynamics.  The lawyer’s responsibility is to heed this 
call, recognize the client beyond her legal interests, and, in the pursuit of 
justice, advocate for the whole client. 
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